This is Jocco Podcast number 13 with Echo Charles and me, Jocco Willink.

This is extracted from US Army FM3TAC06.11 combined arms operations in urban terrain.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the people of Chesnia began to seek full independence.

By 1994, Chesnia had fallen into civil war between pro-independence and pro-Russian factions.

In December 1994, Russia sent 40,000 troops into Chesnia to restore Russian primacy over

the breakaway republic.

An attack was launched by 6,000 mechanized troops against the Cheshiren capital of Grozny.

Instead of the anticipated light resistance, Russian forces encountered heavy resistance

from the Chesans armed with massive amounts of anti-tank weapons.

The Russians were repulsed with shockingly high losses.

They took them another two months of heavy fighting and changing their tactics before they

were able to capture Grozny.

Between January and May 1995, Russian losses in Chesnia were approximately 2,800 killed,

10,000 wounded, and over 500 missing were captured.

The Cheshank casualties were also high, especially among non-combatants.

This war is a major and cautionary episode in military history.

The large-scale lessons of Chesnia lie in these areas.

It showed again the limited effectiveness of heavy weaponry in urban terrain and, by extension,

the crucial importance of well-trained, well-led, well-equipped, and highly motivated infantry.

It proved again that a society judged primitive or chaotic by Western standards can still generate

a tremendous fighting spirit and very effective military discipline.

This is not a new lesson.

...