What I'm going to do this morning is I'm mainly going to talk about freedom's counterfeits,

okay, and then this afternoon I'm going to talk a little bit more about what it would actually be to be free.

Another sort of prefatory note about this paper, this lecture, is this is, you know,

sort of a distillation of a larger work which we always say

when we're hedging which would basically an attempt to mediate a conversation

between a philosopher named Robert Brandom who's at the University of Pittsburgh

and Alastair Macintyre who maybe many of you heard of at Notre Dame. But I'm assuming that the

Brandon stuff would be very foreign to most of you, so I've dropped all the

quotations from Brandom out and I just sort of summarize it. And I just want to

note that because if this were ever to fall in Bob Branden's hands, I just want to

note that I know it's your stuff.

All right, here we go. All right, I take it that we are not entirely interested in the notion

of freedom of the will for its own sake, for mostly because of its implications, but mostly because

of its implications for our understanding of ourselves as responsible for our actions,

and therefore it's subject to some kind of moral or ethical evaluation.

We see ourselves as capable of ethically significant actions, that is, those doings for which

we might laud or shame people, and in this way, we honor or scorn our and other

people's actions in a way that we do not appraise the doings of non-human animals or occurrences

among inanimate beings. That is not to deny that we evaluate such doings or occurrences at all, one might rightly conclude that a bit of hunting

by his pet chameleon was particularly magnificent, or that the destructive movements of a certain

tornado were extraordinarily terrible.

I live in Kansas and I have a chameleon so you can show my cards. The difference between our attitudes

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